• Stefy Lanza (nextime / spora )'s avatar
    Critical security fix: Prevent wssshd server crashes from malformed packets · 37eeaf1e
    Stefy Lanza (nextime / spora ) authored
    - Added comprehensive bounds checking to all WebSocket message parsing
    - Validate JSON structure (braces) before processing to prevent crashes
    - Added length limits and bounds validation for all parameter extractions:
      * client_id: max 64 chars
      * password: max 256 chars
      * request_id: max 64 chars
      * enc/service/version: max 32 chars each
    - Prevent buffer overflows that could corrupt heap metadata
    - Ensure all string operations stay within allocated buffer bounds
    - Server now logs errors and continues running instead of crashing on malformed packets
    - Critical defense against DoS attacks via malformed WebSocket messages
    37eeaf1e
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